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Abstract. The outlook for the Scottish budget in 2020/21 has changed substantially since it was 
published in March. Higher spending and lower revenues will largely be offset by increased 
grant from the UK Government. The pandemic also accentuates the scale of several fiscal risks 
that the Scottish budget was already exposed to, leading to calls for the Scottish Government to 
have access to additional fiscal flexibilities to manage these risks. The Covid-19 health crisis 
and its aftermath poses a range of substantial fiscal challenges for the Scottish budget in 
2021/22 and beyond. But the outlook for the Scottish budget is extremely uncertain beyond 
2020/21, creating challenges for the Scottish parties as they begin preparing their manifestos 
for next May’s Holyrood elections. This paper assesses the risks to the Scottish budget this year; 
appraises the scope for additional budget flexibilities to manage these risks; and considers the 
longer term outlook for the budget in the next parliament, both in terms of the key fiscal issues 
to be addressed and the likely level of resources available. 
I An evolving budget picture for 2020/21 
When the Scottish draft budget was published in February, it contained no mention of 
Coronavirus or Covid-19. By May, the outlook for the budget in 2020/21 had changed so much 
that the Scottish Government published, exceptionally, a Summer Budget Revision (SBR).  
The SBR details total gross spending on the Covid-19 response in 2020/21 of £4bn2. Of this, 
almost £2.8bn represents an increase in total spending from that set out in the budget that was 
finalised in March. At the same time, revenues from Non-Domestic Rates are anticipated to be 
almost £1bn (just over one third) lower than anticipated when the budget was published, as a 
result of the reliefs provided to businesses in the tourism, leisure and hospitality sectors3. The 
1 I am grateful to Andrew Goudie for insightful discussion and comment that helped shape this paper. 
2 Scottish Government, Summer Budget Revision 2021/22 https://www.gov.scot/publications/2020-21-summer-
budget-revision/pages/1/  
3 References from Non Domestic Rates are treated as a negative expenditure in the operation of the Barnett Formula. 
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remainder of the Covid-19 budget response (£250m) comes from reallocation of spending plans 
within portfolios. 
The vast majority of the £4bn gross funding requirement is anticipated to come from a higher 
block grant from the UK Government. At the time of the SBR, £3.6bn of ‘consequentials’ were 
anticipated to flow to the Scottish budget as a result of spending on the Covid-19 response in 
England, (in addition to £100m of consequentials that were announced at the UK budget in 
March). The remainder comes, as already noted, from some reprioritisation of existing spending 
plans. 
Around £2.3b of the £4bn gross funding package is directed at business support, through the 
business rates reliefs and business grants. Just over £600m has been allocated to health and 
social care budgets. A Community Support Fund of £350m targets support and low income and 
vulnerable groups, almost £350m of support has been made available to support public 
transport providers, and £150m has been made available to local authorities to help them cover 
additional costs associated with Covid-19. A range of smaller interventions include funding for 
charities, to support higher claims for Council Tax Reduction, and student support grants.  
In broad terms the Scottish Government has allocated its Covid-19 funding in a similar pattern 
to the UK Government in England. The Scottish Government committed to ‘pass on’ health 
related consequentials to the health budget, and business support related consequentials to 
business support interventions. But at a more granular level of detail there are differences at the 
margin in how eligibility criteria for some business support schemes have been designed, and 
in some of the smaller support packages. The Scottish Government has for example provided 
additional funding support for the self-employed, fishermen, and to support higher payments of 
Carer’s Allowance. 
The Summer Budget Revision is of course a snapshot in time of what will be a continually 
evolving picture. By early June, the anticipated Covid-19 Barnett consequentials had increased 
by a further £200m, to £3.8bn, much of which was allocated to health and social care. On 16 
June, the Scottish Government announced a new ‘Return to Work’ package of £230m, which 
reallocates capital spending in the 2020/21 budget – in areas where slippage is likely to occur 
– to projects which are intended to help support the economic recovery.
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II Spending pressures and budget risks in 2020/21 
The budget is exposed to a number of risks which mean that the resources available to the 
Scottish Government could rise or fall compared to latest estimates. And pressures will certainly 
emerge for further additional spending in some areas as the economy moves out of lockdown 
and into the recovery phase.  
The areas where there is likely to be further spending pressure this financial year are many and 
varied. Speaking at a debate in parliament on 16 June, Cabinet Secretary for Finance Kate Forbes 
said that the need for additional spending to address the Covid-19 response would run into the 
‘hundreds of millions of pounds’. She highlighted the likely need for adaptations in transport 
and education systems to accommodate physical distancing requirements. Mitigating the 
labour market impacts of the crisis will inevitably require more investment skills and 
employability programmes that were designed for a different world (Scotland’s existing flagship 
employability scheme, Fair Start Scotland, was designed for a world of sub-4% unemployment, 
where the focus could concentrate on the ‘hardest to help’ groups).  There will be further 
immediate spending pressures in relation to enterprise, supporting local government to deliver 
key local services, and so on. 
The extent to which this additional funding requirement will come from further consequentials, 
reallocation within the existing budget, or through securing additional ‘budget flexibilities’ 
(discussed subsequently) remains to be seen. Budget decisions taken between now and late 
summer will be set out in the Scottish Government’s Autumn Budget Revision, although this will 
not set out the strategic basis for decisions made or the outlook for the remainder of the financial 
year. 
What about the budget risks in 2020/21? 
One risk is that the Scottish block grant does not increase by the full amount of the 
consequentials that have been indicated by the UK Government. This could arise if the UK 
Government manages to meet some of its Covid-19 spending commitments through 
reprioritisation of existing budgets rather than through ‘new’ spending. If it does so, it is 
possible that the final consequential uplift to the Scottish block grant will be lower than the 
amount currently estimated. However the likelihood that the final uplift is materially lower than 
the currently estimated figure seems low. 
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A second risk is that devolved Scottish revenues do not raise as much as forecast. Of course, it 
goes without saying that Scottish income tax revenues, which were forecast to raise just over 
£12bn at the time of the budget, will raise significantly less than this. The same can be said of 
revenues from LBTT, which was forecast to raise £640 million.  
However, given the way the fiscal framework operates, the Scottish budget will be largely 
protected against these revenue falls in absolute terms. The risk the budget is exposed to is that 
Scottish revenues fall proportionately more (relative to forecast) than rUK revenues.  
The risk that Scottish revenues fall proportionately more than equivalent rUK revenues is very 
real. If economic restrictions are lifted more slowly in Scotland on the basis of health advice, or 
if downturn in the offshore sector disproportionately affects the Scottish economy, then the 
Scottish budget may face a revenue shortfall that could conceivably run into the hundreds of 
million pounds. 
However, the timing of budget reconciliations from these forecast errors, if they arise, may 
provide the Scottish Government with some breathing space. Whilst LBTT shortfalls 
during 2020/21 would impact the Scottish budget in 2020/21 and 2022/23, income tax 
shortfalls in 2020/21 will not impact the Scottish budget until 2023/24 (although this 
clearly should not absolve the government from monitoring emerging revenue data and 
making contingency plans – which might include setting aside some reserves – in the interim 
if required).
III A case for additional budget flexibilities: ‘The right power for the 
wrong fiscal risk’? 
On 16 June, the Scottish Parliament passed a motion that stated that ‘additional short-term 
flexibilities in the Fiscal Framework should be negotiated with the UK Government’. The precise 
nature of the flexibilities sought was not explicitly set out in the motion nor in the opening 
statement by Cabinet Secretary for Finance Kate Forbes. But Ms. Forbes had set out her 
aspirations for additional budget flexibilities (to manage the spending pressures and budget 
uncertainties described above) while giving evidence to the Finance Committee the week 
previously. 
These flexibilities include the ability to transfer capital budget to resource; increasing borrowing 
limits and/or extending the circumstances under which the government can borrow; and 
5 Fraser of Allander 
 
deferring tax forecast reconciliations or spreading them over a longer period. Kate Forbes has 
argued in parliament that a request for additional fiscal flexibilities ‘is not a proxy debate for the 
constitution, but an appeal to common sense’4. 
The logic behind a request to allow capital to resource transfers is clear. Capital investment 
projects are likely to slip this year given that the construction sector has effectively been shut 
down for a quarter of the year already. And whilst there will inevitably be calls to invest in 
‘shovel-ready’ projects as part of the recovery, such projects are harder to identify in practice 
than in theory. Why then shouldn’t capital funding be used to support additional public services 
spending to meet the exceptional requirements of the crisis?   
A request to defer tax forecast reconciliations also has a clear appeal. The Scottish budget faced 
an income tax reconciliation of just over £200m this year (reflecting forecast error in 2017/18), 
and is likely to face a reconciliation of around £600m next year (reflecting forecast error in 
2018/19). Deferring these reconciliations would boost spending power in the short-term, at a 
time when the economy is particularly weak. And there is a chance that at some point in future, 
forecast errors might go the other way, so that deferred negative reconciliations will offset future 
positive reconciliations. But there is no guarantee that things would work out this way, so 
deferring tax reconciliations is transferring further budget risk into the future. 
The arguments around additional borrowing powers are more complex. Since the Covid-19 crisis 
began there have been growing calls for the Scottish Government to have additional scope to 
borrow. As well as the government itself, calls to consider borrowing rules have come from the 
IFS and the recent Report of the Advisory Group on Economic Recovery5, which argued that there 
is ‘a strong case for the Scottish Government to have greater autonomy to use targeted fiscal 
measures to stimulate demand or incentivise behavioural change in the recovery period’. 
However the Advisory Group’s main call was to bring forward the scheduled review of the Fiscal 
Framework as a whole, rather than recommending specific flexibilities that should be sought. 
                                                          
4 Debate in the Scottish Parliament, 16 June 2020 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=12697&i=114863 
5 Towards a robust, resilient wellbeing economy for Scotland 
https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/strategy-plan/2020/06/towards-robust-
resilient-wellbeing-economy-scotland-report-advisory-group-economic-recovery/documents/towards-robust-
resilient-wellbeing-economy-scotland/towards-robust-resilient-wellbeing-economy-
scotland/govscot%3Adocument/towards-robust-resilient-wellbeing-economy-scotland.pdf 
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Currently, the government can borrow up to £450m per annum to fund capital investment, within 
a total cap of £3bn. On resource spending, the government can borrow up to £600m annually 
(within an overall cap of £1.75b), although only under restricted circumstances. Of this £600m 
annual limit, the government can borrow up to £300m to address forecast error (increasing to 
£600m if there is a ‘Scotland-specific economic shock’), and up to £500m for ‘cash 
management’. The government cannot borrow to fund discretionary resource spending (e.g. it 
cannot borrow to pay the salaries of additional nursing staff) or to provide an additional stimulus 
in Scotland.  
It has been clear for some time that the borrowing limit for forecast error is unlikely to be 
adequate (the income tax reconciliation is likely to be around £600m next year, whilst the 
borrowing limit of £300m is in due course supposed to also accommodate forecast errors for 
other devolved taxes and newly devolved social security payments).  
Conversely, the cash management borrowing facility seems unlikely ever to be used. The idea 
behind it is that, once it is fully responsible for delivery of the 11 social security payments being 
devolved, the government might need more flexible access to cash to deal with the lumpiness 
of spending throughout the year. But the Scottish Government has subsequently decided that it 
is unlikely to ever need to borrow for ‘cash management’, mainly because it can drawdown as 
much cash as it needs from HM Treasury (within its annual budget limit of course) with 48 hours 
notice. 
One of the Scottish Government’s arguments will be that, rather than asking for ‘new’ borrowing 
powers, what it would benefit from is a change in circumstances under which it is allowed to 
exercise its existing borrowing limits. The government’s argument is likely to be that, if the 
Treasury has previously agreed to a £500m annual limit for cash management, then allowing the 
Scottish Government to borrow £500m instead for a different purpose – specifically 
discretionary spending – constitutes only a minor additional flexibility, and should therefore be 
easier for the Treasury to acquiesce to. This is what Kate Forbes referred to when she said that 
the Scottish Government has ‘the right power for the wrong fiscal risks’ when giving evidence to 
the Scottish Parliament’s Finance Committee6. To date, the Scottish Government has drawn 
down just £200m of its £1.75bn resource borrowing limit. 
                                                          
6 Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee, 12 June 2020 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=12695  
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There is no especially strong reason why the Scottish Government should not have scope to 
borrow to fund discretionary, temporary increases in resource spending (although the question 
of how and when such powers should be used is more challenging - assuming it has to be paid 
back, borrowing cannot increase the government’s spending on a permanent basis, but rather 
can be used to transfer spending across time to periods when it is most needed). The fact that 
no provision was made in the fiscal framework for discretionary resource borrowing mainly 
reflects the Scottish Government’s priorities at the time the framework was negotiated (the 
Scottish Government’s priority was to secure its preferred mechanism for adjusting the block 
grant, which it appears to have traded off against limited borrowing powers).  
Whilst it is true that the sorts of flexibilities the Scottish Government seeks look on paper to be 
minor, they could in combination substantially increase the government’s spending power in 
the short term. (As noted, flexibilities are sought in relation to the £500m cash management 
borrowing limit, the income tax reconciliation for next year is likely to be around £600m, before 
we get into a discussion about increasing the borrowing limits).  
This raises questions about the sustainability (or prudence) of borrowing more in the short term 
whilst simultaneously putting off borrowing repayments (tax reconciliations) that are about to 
fall due. The Scottish Government has committed to a target that borrowing repayments will not 
exceed five per cent of its resource budget per year. The target has been adopted ‘to ensure we 
do not place an undue financial burden on future policy choices’ (Scottish Budget 2020/21).  
When the 2020/21 budget was published, the government forecast that its repayments would 
total around 3% of its resource budget this year (largely a result of legacy investments through 
Public Private Partnerships, and more recent capital investment through traditional borrowing). 
Viewed in the context of this target, the government does therefore have a reasonable degree of 
headroom to accommodate additional borrowing (the 2 per cent headroom is equivalent to 
around an additional £600m in annual borrowing repayments). 
The 5 per cent ceiling is of course arbitrary. But the point is that even if the Scottish 
Government’s aspirations for additional borrowing flexibilities are realised, the question of how 
those flexibilities should be used is more challenging. The benefits of additional spending today 
will need to be weighed against the costs of reduced spending in future budgets. Given the 
uncertainties over how long the post Covid economy may remain weak, the issue of the 
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repayment terms for any borrowing will be material to this assessment. But clearly the ability to 
borrow more will not in itself be a panacea for the government’s fiscal challenges. 
It remains to be seen what the Treasury view of these arguments will be, although HM Treasury 
has historically been reluctant to cede control over the UK fiscal aggregates (Scottish 
Government borrowing counts against the UK’s overall fiscal targets). Arguably, the UK 
Government might be more willing to permit additional borrowing by the Scottish Government 
now that UK borrowing is already in the hundreds of billion £, as opposed to the days when it 
was targeting a fiscal surplus (a target which in theory could have been knocked off course by a 
few hundred million of Scottish borrowing). But it seems unlikely that material new flexibilities 
will be agreed to without some quid pro quo. 
 
IV The outlook for the Scottish budget in the next parliament 
The 2021/22 budget will be the last one set in this parliament. It will set the scene for the launch 
of the Scottish parties’ manifestos for the May 2021 Holyrood elections. 
The set of fiscal issues that will need to be grappled with in the 2021/22 budget and by the 
parties in their subsequent manifestos would have been challenging without Covid but now 
begins to look rather daunting. At a minimum some of the key issues are likely to include, but 
will not be limited to: 
 The response to concern over pay and conditions among public sector key workers;  
 The financial implications of a renewed emphasis on resilience rather than efficiency in 
health and social care;  
 The vision for newly devolved social security payments for the sick and disabled;  
 Increasing capacity in the education system to accommodate ongoing social distancing 
if required (and addressing pre-existing performance challenges in school education 
which are likely to have been accentuated during the crisis);  
 The policy proposals for making progress towards the Scottish Parliament’s child poverty 
targets, including proposals for Scotland-specific top-ups to welfare payments;  
 Actions to support the economic recovery in relation to business support, skills and 
employability;  
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 Supporting the higher education sector in the face of major disruption to student 
numbers and revenue streams; and 
 The role for local government in contributing to many of these challenges at local level. 
There will also be important questions for tax policy, particularly how to balance revenue raising 
with the need to support the economic recovery. The current environment surely strengthens the 
argument for reform of property tax – providing scope to increase revenues progressively and 
without damaging growth prospects. But it might also point to a rethink about current sources 
of tax revenue – wealth and carbon seem better prospects for tax than tourism or parking spaces 
at the current time – and the Scottish Government in principal has scope to introduce new taxes 
under the current constitutional settlement. 
Next year’s manifestos will have the chance to frame these specific issues (and others) within 
parties’ broader visions for the post-Covid ‘new normal’ – including the vision for a renewed 
social contract, new perspectives on the ultimate objective of public policy. Whilst these are to 
an extent challenges for the future, there is an urgency to begin the debate now.  
But substantial uncertainty hangs over a critical question: what level of resource is the Scottish 
Government likely to have at its disposal to address these challeges? 
Despite significant tax devolution, the key factor determining the size of the Scottish budget 
remains the decisions of the UK Government regarding its overall fiscal stance, and in particular 
how it decides to prioritise departmental spending. It is this that influences the broad size of the 
Scottish Government’s spending envelope as it determines the Scottish block grant via the 
Barnett formula (a spending envelope which can be varied through Scottish Government tax 
choices or other factors that influence the strength of devolved Scottish revenues relative to rUK 
revenues).  
If Covid-19 hadn’t come along, we would by about now have had a Spending Review from the UK 
Government and a Medium Term Financial Strategy from the Scottish Government. Taken 
together, these would have given the political parties a good indication of the sorts of levels of 
resources they could shape their manifesto plans around, and the ways in which changes to tax 
policy might enable them to vary this envelope.  
Without these routemaps, there is more uncertainty around the outlook for the Scottish budget 
and thus the constraints that might face the Scottish Government in 2021/22 and beyond, and 
what these constraints might imply for various policy trade-offs.  
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V Beyond 2020/21: the UK fiscal outlook 
What can we say about the outlook for the UK Government’s fiscal position, the likely direction 
of its fiscal choices, and the implication for the Scottish budget? What follows is not a prediction, 
and certainly not a view about what ‘should’ happen, but an attempt to assess the likely broad 
direction of travel for fiscal policy, taking into account the economic outlook, prevailing political 
discourses and the likely standpoint of the incumbent UK government. 
The UK Government’s fiscal position will depend heavily on the evolution of the health crisis 
over the next 12 months and beyond. But it would be misleading for anyone to claim they had a 
clear sense of what is likely to happen in this context. Will there be a second wave of the virus 
in autumn, a series of localised outbreaks, or will the virus mutate into something more (or less) 
benign? The outcomes of these highly uncertain questions will in turn influence the extent of the 
economic restrictions, and by consequence the scale of the economic support measures.  
Nonetheless, it goes without saying that UK Government borrowing will increase substantially. 
In May, the OBR estimated that Public Sector Net Borrowing could be around £300bn in 2020/21 
alone (compared to a March forecast of £56bn) as a result of higher spending and lower 
receipts7. Subsequent public finance data has revealed that the UK Government had borrowed 
over £100bn in April and May alone8. Combined with a fall in the size of the economy, this could 
take borrowing as a percentage of GDP in 2020/21 to 15%. By May Public Sector Net Debt had 
risen to just over 100% of GDP, the first time that net debt has exceeded the size of the economy 
since the 1960s. 
Looking slightly further ahead, the IFS estimates that borrowing is likely to remain elevated at 
around 5-6% of GDP for several years due to enduring economic weakness9. A second wave of 
the virus and second lockdown could see borrowing exceed 20% this year and 10% in 2021/22. 
There is considerable uncertainty around such scenarios, but the numbers are stark. Just over 
ten years ago, politicians across a broad political spectrum fretted about debt numbers that 
looked considerably more benign than this. Debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 34% in 
                                                          
7 OBR: Coronavirus reference scenario. https://obr.uk/coronavirus-analysis/  
8 OBR: Public Sector Finances, May 2020 https://obr.uk/docs/June-2020-Commentary-on-the-public-sector-
finances.pdf  
9 The outlook for the public finances under the long shadow of COVID-19, IFS Briefing Note BN295 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/BN295-The-outlook-for-the-public-finances-under-the-long-shadow-of-COVID-
19.pdf  
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2007/8 to 69% in 2010/11, and a prevailing political narrative emerged that this ratio needed 
to be brought back down if the UK was to be resilient to future economic shocks – although there 
was of course plenty of disagreement  about the timescales over which consolidation would be 
required and how it should be balanced between tax increases versus spending cuts. 
Currently, the prevailing view – and not just within the UK – is justifiably more relaxed about the 
possibility that debt and deficits might remain elevated for some time. The change in prevailing 
perspective is attributable to a variety of factors. Partly it is from necessity – with a likelihood 
that further fiscal stimulus masures will be announced later this year to support the economy to 
recover as it emerges from lockdown. It is also because the prophecies of those who argued in 
2010 that higher debts would be punished in the markets by higher interest rates on that debt 
have failed to be realised. The UK Government has not struggled to finance the huge increase in 
borrowing so far in 2020/21, in fact debt servicing costs have continued to fall, albeit in 
significant part due to the substantial purchases of government bonds by the Bank of England.  
Nonetheless, feeling relaxed about living with a higher level of debt for a prolonged period is not 
the same as feeling relaxed about the idea that debt continues to grow indefinitely. At some 
point there will be moves to at least stabilise the debt ratio. This implies the need for fiscal 
consolidation at some point in future, although there are at least three uncertainties around this. 
First, there is significant uncertainty about how much fiscal consolidation might be required – 
this will depend on the size of the longrun hit to the economy, and the relationship between the 
growth of the economy and the costs of servicing the debt. Second, there is uncertainty around 
the timing of when consolidation might begin – which will in part depend on perceptions of the 
risk that interest rates might rise (without a commensurate increase in growth). Third, there is 
uncertainty about how any consolidation might be achieved across a balance of spending cuts 
and tax rises (which is relevant to the outlook for the Scottish block grant). 
On the third of these points, there is a strong case that, unlike the austerity of the 2010s, the 
next fiscal consolidation should come much more through tax increases than spending cuts, for 
several reasons. Practically, it is hard to see where substantial public sector cuts could be made, 
coming on the back of ten years of austerity. Politically, there will be huge impetus to improve 
the resilience of the health and social care system to future pandemics and to recognise the 
value of key workers in the public sector – all of which implies higher spending. And the very 
unequal impacts of the health crisis and the economic restrictions further helps justify the case 
for using progressive taxes on income and wealth to fund the economic recovery. Proposals for 
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tax-raising reforms have been widely discussed, ranging from significant reforms to existing 
taxes (such as extending NICs to those above state pension age to reforming income tax reliefs) 
to the introduction of more comprehensive taxes on wealth or carbon, or to windfall taxes on the 
businesses that are seen to have benefited from the lockdown. 
A conclusion might be that, whilst the Scottish block grant is unlikely to see real terms spending 
cuts over the short term, the extent to which departmental budget spending will increase is very 
uncertain. This reflects in part the economic uncertainties, but also the inherent reticence of the 
incumbent UK Government to be seen as a tax-raising government.  
 
VI Conclusions 
On latest estimates Scottish resource spending in 2020/21 will be 8% higher than was set out 
in the budget. At the same time, devolved revenues from Non-Domestic Rates, income tax and 
LBTT will contribute much less than anticipated. The difference is effectively met through higher 
UK Government borrowing, with the Scottish budget becoming less reliant than anticipated on 
devolved revenues. 
The Scottish budget will continue to evolve throughout 2020/21. As we move from the lockdown 
stage to the economic recovery phase, fiscal policy will shift from its recent focus on insurance 
and support to more traditional recessionary stimulus measures. This may involve further 
consequentials flowing to the Scottish budget in 2020/21. It may also involve some temporary 
tax cuts at UK level. 
There is a good case for the Scottish Government to have greater flexibilities for managing its 
budget. The case for some of these flexibilities is strongest as a temporary measure (e.g. 
deferring tax reconciliations). But there may be a case for other flexibilities on a more permanent 
basis, particularly in relation to enhanced scope for borrowing.  
Whilst an increase in budget flexibilities is useful, it is not without risk for the Scottish 
Government, as there is a danger that increased borrowing and deferment of tax reconciliations 
this year increases budget risks in future years – potentially when the economy remains 
relatively weak. Enhanced fiscal flexibilities are not in themselves a panacea to the substantial 
budgetary challenges over the medium term.  
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The Covid-19 crisis and its aftermath poses a number of fundamental questions for public policy 
in the coming years. Key questions might include but are not limited to: How can public policy 
support a robust, fair and tax-rich recovery? What would a fair settlement for key workers look 
like? What role is there for devolved social security powers or tax reform in mitigating some of 
the increased inequality that Covid-19 is likely to generate? How do we enhance the resilience 
of the health and social care systems against future disease outbreaks? 
At the same time there is huge uncertainty around the outlook for the Scottish budget, which is 
critically dependent on the UK Government’s fiscal policy decisions.  Over the past few years we 
have become completely inured to the word uncertainty, even though – in the context of Brexit, 
hung parliaments and snap elections – it has not been unjustly used. But it goes without saying 
that the levels of uncertainty that have applied in recent years are relatively benign compared to 
the extreme uncertainty that we face at the moment. 
Uncertainty applies not only to the outlook for the Scottish block grant (which in turn depends 
on UK Government fiscal policy decisions), but also on the prospects for the Scottish economy 
– which influences the outlook for revenues from Scottish income tax and other devolved taxes. 
This uncertainty provides a very challenging backdrop to the Scottish political parties as they 
begin to think about their 2021 manifestos.  
On the plus side, this uncertainty might allow for a stepping back from meaningless manifesto 
commitments to spend £x million on portfolio y, and instead to focus on the vision for broader 
outcomes. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Scottish political parties will need to build in a degree 
of flexibility to their manifesto plans. Rather than a set of specific and costed policy proposals 
(although when do we ever get those anyway?), the parties will need to articulate options and 
how these would be prioritised under different economic and fiscal policy scenarios.  
The set of public policy challenges next parliament is immense, and the Scottish budget will 
need to be used boldly and imaginatively to rise to these challenges. 
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